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**COMMUNIST CHINA**

and

**AMERICAN FAR EASTERN POLICY**



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Communist China  
and  
American Far Eastern Policy

by  
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(This article is based on an address made at Ohio State University on July 21, 1955. It is reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin* of November 7, 1955.)

The Communist conquest of China has compelled the United States radically to readjust its approach toward the problems of the Far East. Manifestations of mutuality and friendliness between the American and Chinese peoples have been terminated by the fiat of Communist rulers on the China mainland. Instead of being an Asian contributor to the development of peaceful international cooperation and a cornerstone of Far Eastern political stability and military security, the China mainland now has been converted into the major base of military aggression and Communist subversion in Asia.

The problem that has faced U.S. policymakers since the Chinese Communists took over the China mainland has required two concomitant and related efforts: (1) meeting and repelling the hostile thrusts of Chinese Communist power in Asia and (2) rebuilding non-Communist Asian strength and stability. The direction and substance of United States policies since 1949 have been developed increasingly along lines directed toward the achievement of these ends.

The emergence of Communist power in China has violently changed the balance of power in the Far East and vastly increased the tasks and problems of the free countries of Asia in seeking the attainment of their national objectives of domestic progress and national independence. In the mid-thirties, China itself, under the leadership of the Nationalist Government at Nanking, was gradually emerging from a long period of weakness and instability. But the Chinese Government then was committed to special treaty provisions and foreign rights which prevented it from exercising unfettered control over its own people and resources. Japan already controlled Manchuria, and Russia exerted large influence in Sinkiang. War lords

fragmented the authority of the Central Government, and Chinese Communist rebel forces created large islands of chaos and suffering in the rural hinterland. Although the general picture was one of progress and hope, China was still an area of weakness and instability.

In the rest of Asia at that time, Japan stood preeminent in military and industrial might. Japan was the center of control, order, and stability in northeast Asia. Throughout the rest of Asia, except in Thailand, Western powers maintained establishments which provided order—the United States in the Philippines; the French in Indochina; the Dutch in Indonesia; Great Britain in Malaya, Burma, and lesser areas, as well as in the lands lying to the west.

This prewar Asian world of Japanese power, colonial order, and Chinese recovery was shattered during the course of the Second World War and its aftermath. First, Japan's advancing columns of aggressive armies and administrators destroyed Western colonial power and administrative systems under which millions of people lived in the Far East. In China, they cut the Chinese Government off from its major areas of economic and political strength and supplanted its authority with puppet regimes. Japan thus undermined order and brought the chaos of war to those parts of Asia which lay outside her boundaries. In turn, the Allied victory over Japan brought about the destruction of the Japanese Empire. By the end of the war no part of Asia had escaped chaos and the radical changes precipitated by war.

#### **Power Vacuum In Asia**

The defeat of Japan immediately created a major power vacuum in Asia. Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa, cut adrift from Japanese control, required the establishment of new administrative systems, both local and central. Japan itself lay exhausted and impotent. The extensive eco-

nomic network which Japan had created to bind Asia to herself was torn asunder as parts and pieces were repossessed by the countries she had occupied. Not only did Asia lose 8 million tons of Japanese shipping sunk during the war, but it was deprived, as well, of the large regional networks of Japanese marine insurance, warehousing, banking, and communications which had provided the Far East with essential trading services. The destruction of the Western commercial and trading institutions and Japan's network of trading organizations and facilities made Far Eastern economic recovery a slow and costly undertaking.

Economic paralysis was paralleled by political instability and weakness. Driven by nationalism, fed by wartime resistance movements, and encouraged by American and European nations, seven new states emerged in the Far East—nine altogether in Asia—to supplant prewar colonial or Western-supported governments. Korea was freed from Japan; the Philippines, long encouraged to prepare for self-government, was granted independence by the United States; Indonesia became independent of the Netherlands; Burma was restored to independence by Great Britain; and the three states in Indochina—Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia—gradually secured their independence from France.

To replace the relatively efficient administration provided by the Western metropolitan powers and Japan prior to the war, these newly independent countries had to develop from meager resources their own administrative systems. In the process of governing themselves, each of these countries was confronted with enormous problems as it tried simultaneously to recover from war-inflicted wounds, to control dissident and subversive groups, to develop new and workable political organs, to create conditions favorable for economic development, and to furnish the local and national services required by its people. Not the least of these problems was the creation of



political parties capable of providing political direction and winning the support and safeguarding the interests of their own peoples.

### **Emerging of Chinese Communist Party**

In this Far Eastern scene of new and untried governments and the chaos and weakness of war-time destruction, an effective and ruthless Communist Party established its power on the China mainland. It rapidly developed and organized its political and economic resources, and with Russian help emerged as the strongest military power in Asia. And the party itself overshadowed all others in Asia in size, experience, discipline, and resources.

This aggressive Chinese Communist regime became a more insidious threat to Asia and the free world than Japanese imperialism had been. For, in effect, the Chinese Communist conquest of the China mainland extended Communist power and the Soviet world into the heart of Asia. The relative power of Communist China in an Asia weak from the ravages of war and in the throes of a major political revolution and economic readjustment in itself represented a basic alteration in the balance of Asian power as it had existed prior to the war. With this Communist regime linked directly to the Soviet world, the shift in power acquired drastic dimensions. The prospects of communism in Asia were completely altered, and the task of the free world was immeasurably increased. American policymakers had to reckon, therefore, with Communist China as a threat to Asia and the free world, on the one hand, and with the vulnerabilities of Far Eastern countries to Chinese communism, on the other hand.

Despite shifts in tactics from time to time, the Chinese Communists have given no evidence of abandoning their ultimate objectives—within China, the establishment of totalitarian (or, in their terms, “democratic centralist”) socialism, and outside of China, the extension of Communist

power through the promotion of the world Communist revolution. In international politics, as in internal politics, the Chinese Communists have, when expedient, accommodated those whom they regard as their enemies; but when occasion offered or circumstances changed, the Peiping regime has undertaken, like other Communist parties, to destroy its enemies or erstwhile friends.

Communist attitudes toward India and Burma illustrate this tactical shift. Depicted at the Peking Trade Union Conference in 1949 as countries which terrorized workers and stood in need of liberation, they are now called “peace-loving” states with whom coexistence is not only possible but also highly desirable. Every effort now is being made by Peiping to turn these and other countries against the United States and to persuade them to forego as unnecessary individual and collective measures for their self-defense. At the same time, however, the Chinese Communists continue their active efforts to strengthen subversive movements within each of these countries for the time when they may make a bid for power. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists push ahead their program of modernizing and enlarging their own military establishment, already the most powerful in Asia. There is every evidence of continuing dedication to the expansionist goals of international communism.

### **Military Strength of Chinese Reds**

The threat of Chinese Communist military power looms dark over Asia. The Chinese Communists have over 3½ million men in their field and public security forces. In addition, it is estimated that there are between 6 and 10 million men in the militia units which the Chinese Communists use to maintain domestic control. The field forces clearly are trained and equipped to engage in modern warfare. During and following the Korean war these field forces have undergone progressive modernization. With the help of the Soviet



Union the Chinese Communist Army has acquired increasing numbers of mechanized and armored military units. The Chinese Communist Air Force has an estimated 2,000 aircraft, of which over 1,600 are believed to be combat types, including jet fighters and bombers of recent Soviet design. A small Chinese Communist Navy is being steadily strengthened by the addition of naval vessels from the Soviet Union, probably including some Soviet-type submarines.

The intentions of the Chinese Communists have been clearly and repeatedly stated. The Chinese Communist Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai said to the National People's Congress at Peiping on July 16:

The Chinese People's Liberation Army must, in the internal situation, strive to consolidate the People's Democratic Dictatorship, and vigorously build up strength for the liberation of the Chinese territory of Taiwan. . . . To undertake [this] sacred mission . . . , we must speedily build up powerful, modernized armed forces. We must have not only a mighty army but also a mighty air force and a mighty navy.

All available information indicates that the Chinese Communist military forces will continue to grow in power and improve in efficiency. This military program is intended to assure the Chinese Communist regime of its position as the dominant Asian power in terms of military strength. It could also widen the already enormous gap between Communist China and other Asian nations with respect to military strength.

### **Dangers of Subversion**

It is not military power alone, however, which makes Communist China a menace to Asia. Its threat to the Far East is far more varied. Skilled in the manipulation of political movements and popular discontent and trained to organize and utilize subversive groups whose activities can be coordinated with the political, military, and economic weapons of Peiping's foreign policy, the

Chinese Communists have vastly increased the dangers of subversion in the Far East. Since Mao Tse-tung's triumph on the mainland, the Chinese Communists systematically have sought to weld the various Communist movements in non-Communist Asia into a coherent and unified regional force capable of acting under their central direction.

Acting alone, the Communist movement in each of the non-Communist Far Eastern countries has only limited capabilities. The abortive efforts of several Asian Communist parties—in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines—to seize political power by direct action during the period from 1948 to 1950 demonstrated their lack of indigenous strength. At the present time, no Communist Party in the non-Communist countries of the Far East possesses sufficient military strength of its own to attempt to seize power from the existing government. If the problem of subversion were a purely domestic problem, each of the non-Communist countries of Asia could probably cope successfully with the disloyal and subversive Communist elements within its own borders. But Mao's victory on the China mainland has provided Asian communism with a firm base and exposed each of these countries to increased hazards from externally supported Communist groups.

Prior to the establishment of a Communist base on the China mainland, Asian Communists lacked regional unity and central direction. They were divided by diverse historical origins, backgrounds, and experience. The Korean and Japanese parties were founded through the direct efforts of the Comintern. Others, such as the parties in Indonesia and India and, to a degree, in Indochina, owed their origin to mother parties in Europe. The parties in Indochina, Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines were created largely through the efforts of Chinese Communists.

There were also other factors which limited the effectiveness of the Communist parties in the Far East. Their efforts to use Soviet strategies and tactics primarily designed to further Communist objectives in the West at times resulted only in frustration. Soviet plans often had little relevance to the problems of the Asian parties. Being remote from the Kremlin, the Communist parties of South and Southeast Asia often received little attention or direction from Moscow, with the result that they sometimes operated in relative isolation from the worldwide Communist movement. Under these conditions it is understandable that Asian Communist movements were plagued and divided by problems of factionalism, dissidence, and rivalry for leadership.

The Chinese Communists have moved rapidly to correct this disorganized situation. Their influence, prestige, power, and location have placed the Chinese party in an overwhelmingly dominant position in the Asian Communist scene. Asia's Communists now see a Chinese Communist Party, claiming a membership of about 7 million, in control of Asia's largest army, with vast territories populated by more than 500 million people and with a party leadership unrivaled in experience and prestige in the Asian Communist world. It is obvious to the estimated 124,000 party members and their 3 to 4 million disciplined supporters scattered through the non-Communist countries of the Far East that their future is bound directly to Communist China and to the support they receive from over 8¼ million party members in the Chinese party and its North Korean and Viet Minh affiliates.

#### **Ties With Other Asian Communists**

To extend its influence and control over the Communist movements in free Asia, Peiping has been developing organizational ties with each of the Far Eastern Communist parties. From Korea and Japan in the north to Burma and Indo-

nesia in the south ideological direction is provided through varied channels. In some countries the Communist Bank of China and Chinese Communist diplomatic and consular officials act as agents of the Chinese Communist Party. In other areas only clandestine connections are available. Periodic conferences in Peiping with representatives from all or most of the countries of the Far East provide occasions for developing coordinated regional plans and programs under Chinese guidance. Daily broadcasts to the countries of the Far East from mainland China in every major Far Eastern language convey Peiping's up-to-the-minute interpretation of current events and its guidance on major issues for Communist groups throughout the region. From Peiping go funds, propaganda materials, and agents. To the mainland come foreign agents for training, foreign military units to be equipped and trained, and potential leaders of revolutionary movements for harbor against the time when their services may be needed. Through organizational ties, ideological guidance, the development of operational methods, and central direction, Peiping is converting local Communist parties into a regional force. These parties increasingly demonstrate their ability to act in unison to exploit regional developments, to advance Chinese Communist objectives, to attack special targets, and to disrupt regional cooperation among the non-Communist countries of eastern Asia.

#### **Reactions to Communist Power**

Communist China has made its threatening presence unmistakably felt throughout the Far East and in the world. Each country of the Far East has reacted in some way to the menace and lodgment of Communist power, both military and subversive. The sharpest reactions have come from the two states whose continued existence has been most directly jeopardized by Communist success and ambitions—the Republics of China and



Korea. Both have already faced the possibilities of extinction by the aggressive military forces of Communist China. Both Governments seek the fulfillment of their national aims through policies which will enable them to free from Communist oppression the lands and the peoples conquered by the Communists. Both Governments believe that their security and that of Asia depend on military strength to save them until the aggressive, militarized Chinese Communist totalitarian system is destroyed. In effect, the leaders of Free China and Free Korea maintain a posture of defensive hostility toward Communist China. They have little alternative, for they have been singled out as avowed objects of Communist destruction. As a result, both countries have bent every effort to build up their military strength and now possess the strongest military forces in free Asia.

Neither of these Governments has political or economic relations with the Peiping regime, and both consistently oppose any recognition of the political claims and any extension of the political and economic influence of that regime. Moreover, alert to the dangers of subversion, they have resolutely rooted out within the areas under their control all known Communist agents and organs. There is no place for the subversive or the fellow traveler in these embattled countries. Aggression, not subversion, is the major Communist threat they fear, for the vast majority of their peoples have experienced and rejected communism.

More recently a third divided country has appeared on the Asian scene—the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Geneva agreements of July 1954 partitioned Viet-Nam at approximately the 17th parallel, pending an ultimate settlement of political problems. While it has agreed not to use force to bring about reunification, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is not a party to the Geneva agreements and neither recognizes nor deals with the Communist Viet Minh, which is in control north of the 17th parallel. Nor does it recognize the Peiping regime, which not only encouraged

and supplied the Viet Minh in its strike for power but also extended to its leader, Ho Chi Minh, and his Communist regime diplomatic recognition and international status even before the conclusion of an armistice in the summer of 1954. Since the Free Vietnamese are under increasing Communist pressure, their only hope for survival seems to be on a basis of continuous resistance to all forms of Communist power. This means a costly investment of Viet-Nam's energies and resources in military strength and in an effort to achieve political control over dissident and subversive elements.

Two other countries, the Philippines and Thailand, reacted to the emergence of a powerful Chinese Communist regime by striving to root out domestic affiliates and potential agents—the local Communists—and cutting them off from any connections with China and the outside. Resistant to Communist China's claims and distrustful of its objectives, both Governments have broken political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with the China mainland. But in each of these countries there is still an operative Communist Party organization maintaining an illegal existence, encouraged and defended by the voice of Peiping. In Thailand the party is, in effect, a Chinese party with perhaps 50,000 supporters and large influence in at least one of the Chinese regional fraternities. The subversive threat cannot be ignored here any more than it can be ignored to the south, in Malaya, where the party has a warring guerrilla army and a supporting Minh Yuen mass organization, virtually all Chinese. Fearful of Communist China's military power, Thailand and the Philippines have undertaken to develop their defensive military strength and to join in collective security arrangements with each other and with other Asian and Pacific powers in the Manila Pact. Both countries sent military contingents to Korea to assist in repelling Communist aggression.



While Cambodia and Laos have not had much time in their newly acquired independence to react fully to the threat of Chinese Communist power, they have taken initial steps to protect themselves. There is no doubt that they sense their weakness and vulnerability in the face of the Chinese Communists and their Viet Minh partners.

### **Communist Party in Japan**

The reaction of the Japanese people to Communist China presents another situation. While Japan has neither diplomatic nor formal economic relations with Communist China, the Japanese Government has submitted to a certain amount of so-called "people's diplomacy" with unofficial Japanese groups and organizations in the interests of securing the repatriation of thousands of Japanese nationals and the release of captured and castaway fishermen. Perhaps because, until recently, they have had little responsibility for their own military security and historically have been concerned with the threat of Russian rather than of Chinese power, some Japanese do not appear to have awakened fully to this new Chinese Communist threat. They seem still to be living in the neutralist and pacifist dream which came upon them after their defeat in war.

The desire of some Japanese for accommodation with the Communist regime on the China mainland rests perhaps more on economic motivation than political preference, but it also reflects the social and economic frustrations and military impotence which have engendered a mood of accommodation. Here the Communist Party enjoys a quasi-legal existence. It has an underground directorate and a membership of about 80,000, supported by controlled organizations with over 350,000 fellow-traveling members. Once one of the weakest of all Communist parties in Asia, the Japanese Communist Party has now become one of the largest Communist parties in the non-Communist part of eastern Asia, possessing obvi-

ous capabilities to move both directly and indirectly against the Government. The Japanese Government and people have adopted measures, however, which have increasingly restricted the subversive potentialities of the Japanese Communist Party and movement.

Burma and Indonesia reacted to the emergence of Communist China by adopting external policies of accommodation while at the same time undertaking internal measures to check the activities of local and Chinese Communists. They appear to hope that Chinese Communist domestic preoccupations, the restraints on Peiping of United Nations influence and world opinion, the power of other international groupings, and a friendly attitude on their part will save them from external Communist attack. However, diplomatic, economic, and cultural intercourse, reinforced by the ties to the China mainland of large minorities of resident Chinese, provide the Peiping regime with a tempting and exploitable opportunity to encourage and support those groups which seek to subvert the power of these Governments. By their efforts to suppress Chinese Communist-supported activities in their own countries, Burma and Indonesia show that they have recognized the subversive threat of Chinese communism. The Governments of both countries, in fact, have successfully crushed Communist revolts by drastic military measures—revolts which had the explicit blessings of the Chinese Communists.

Thus, in varying degrees, these exposed countries of eastern Asia have been concerned with their vulnerability to the military, political, and economic activities of the Chinese Communists. After the Chinese Communists conquered the mainland, their military vulnerability was immediate and acute, and they turned to the West, particularly the United States, for assistance in resisting the aggressive thrusts of Communist China's military might. The United States, already possessing military forces and having mil-

itary commitments in the Far East—in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the Pacific Trust Territories—as a result of the defeat and occupation of Japan, undertook the primary task of assisting countries of free Asia to redress the military balance of power.

#### **U. S. Security and Defense Policies in Far East**

The development of the security and defense policies and programs of the United States in the Far East was in response to the needs of free Asian countries imperiled by hostile Communist power and the result of direct provocations of the Chinese Communists toward the United States and its friends. Immediately after the North Korean Communists launched their attack, the Chinese Communists demonstrated their support of Communist aggression. As a result, on June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to guard Taiwan and to prevent Chinese Nationalist air and sea operations against the China mainland as a measure designed to protect the flank of United Nations forces in Korea. In October the Chinese Communist military forces intervened massively in Korea. This caused the United States to drop its proposal of September 21, 1950, that the United Nations General Assembly study and make recommendations on the problem of the future of Taiwan. Also, after this intervention, the United States undertook to provide military assistance to the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Even at that time, the military assistance agreement with the Chinese Government, formalized in an exchange of notes of January 30 and February 9, 1951, specified that the military assistance was to be used by the Chinese Government only "to maintain its internal security or its legitimate self-defense." In May 1951 a small United States military advisory group was established on Taiwan.

Communist aggression in Korea, coupled with the obvious and growing hostility of Russia to-

ward the West and its seizure and fortification of Japan's northern islands, made the security needs of Japan especially urgent. The peace treaty with Japan was accompanied by a security treaty between the United States and Japan. When these two treaties were approved by the Senate of the United States on March 20, 1952, two additional security treaties were also ratified by the Senate: the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Philippines and the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. These four treaties, taken together, provided an initial foundation for security in the Far East. In the words of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, they

... constitute an important contribution toward clarifying the position of the United States in the Pacific. They are logical and desirable steps in liquidating the old war and strengthening the fabric of peace in the Far East against the danger of a new war.

The continuing menace of Communist aggression in Korea resulted in the signing on October 1, 1953, of a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. In the words of the Korean Foreign Minister, this defense treaty was concluded to "conserve the fruits of our joint efforts so far made to check aggression and contribute toward putting a final stop to encroachments upon freedom." Secretary Dulles, concerned with the future, pointed out that this treaty recognized that "in a world where the forces of aggression still constitute a threat, constant preparedness and constant vigilance are the price of our freedom."

Meantime, the consolidation of Communist gains in North Viet-Nam underscored the need for united action to deter further Communist-sponsored aggression in Asia. As early as April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower foresaw that the approaching cease-fire in Korea would allow Communist China to increase its aid to Viet Minh forces in Indochina. At Manila, therefore, on September 8, 1954, the Southeast Asia Collective



Defense Treaty was signed by Australia, New Zealand, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty not only provided for meeting collectively external armed attack against any state within the treaty area but also provided for the adoption of measures to be taken for the common defense from other than armed attack. A protocol to the treaty makes the treaty applicable, upon request, to the territories of Free Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

### **Republic of China**

The mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, a further step in securing the peoples of Asia from Communist aggression, was signed on December 2, 1954, against a background of mounting Chinese Communist belligerence. The Peiping regime had made its hostility unmistakable. In July 1954 it had launched a major propaganda campaign threatening to "liberate Taiwan." On September 3, Quemoy Island had been subjected to the heaviest bombardment sustained by the Chinese Nationalist forces in 5 years. On November 23 the Chinese Communists had sentenced 13 Americans to long imprisonment, including 11 airmen of the United Nations Command who were held in violation of the Korean Armistice.

Following the signing of this defense treaty, the Chinese Communists increased their hostilities against the territories and forces of the Republic of China by intensively bombing the Tachen Islands and seizing Ichiang Island on January 18-20. This led the Congress of the United States to adopt a joint resolution on January 29 authorizing the President:

to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in,

assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This authority was granted to the President in recognition of the fact that certain territories of the Republic of China—

are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores.

Thus gradually, and under the compelling threats of Chinese Communist power, Asian nations and peoples have joined their efforts to ours to meet the hostile power of Communist arms and aggressive actions. Collectively and by persistent effort on the part of many nations, Asia and the free world have undertaken to develop the military power necessary to meet and counter the threatening military strength of Communist China. At the same time, the United States has continued to use its influence in favor of renouncing the use of force to settle the issues raised by the Communist regime in Peiping. In the United Nations Security Council the United States supported the New Zealand proposal for considering with the Chinese Communists the question of ending hostilities among the islands along the coast of China. Secretary Dulles has repeatedly stated the willingness of the United States to discuss the question of a cease-fire with the Chinese Communists. In this way the United States has supported the development of a regional system of collective security within the terms of the United Nations Charter and in support of its principles. The defensive character of these security programs and policies is evident in the very nature of their development.

### **U. S. Economic Policies in Far East**

These military defense policies have been supplemented by related economic actions. The United States and the nations of the free world through the United Nations have adopted economic measures to restrict the warmaking capa-



bilities of the Chinese Communists. When Communist China intervened in the Korean war, the United States on its part revoked all general licenses for all exports to Communist China. We imposed a ban on imports from Communist China and established strict license controls on all financial transactions between the United States and the Communist China mainland. In July 1950 other free world countries also adopted measures for controlling free world trade with Communist China and North Korea. Finally, some 45 countries, including several who are not members of the United Nations, have supported the United Nations resolution of May 18, 1951, which recommended an embargo on the shipment to Communist China and North Korea of

arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

The United States also has taken other related actions against the Chinese Communist aggressor. We have joined with other nations to oppose the efforts of the Chinese Communist regime to extend its political influence and the orbit of its political activities. This it has attempted to do through the establishment of diplomatic relations and by its efforts to preempt China's seat in the United Nations. We recognize not the Peiping regime but the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan as the Government of China; and the United States has taken the lead in opposing the claim of the Peiping regime to represent China, in place of the Republic of China, in the United Nations.

#### **Need for Strengthening Local Governments**

Another major effort of American policy has been to assist in the rebuilding of strength and stability in the Far East. The establishment of Communist power on the China mainland has given special urgency to this effort, for the vulnerabilities of the Far East to Chinese Communist

subversive activities are a major source of danger in the area. The security of non-Communist countries of the Far East must rest on a platform of political and economic strength. Major strides have already been made toward this end.

Time will be needed to reduce the vulnerabilities of our friends in Asia to the local and subversive activities of the Communists. The most effective means, perhaps, of curbing and extinguishing communism is the development of strong and efficient local and national governments. In many countries of the Far East a dangerously large field of exploitation still remains open to the Communists and other dissident groups. In some countries the majority of the people do not participate in organized political activities and are isolated from the processes of government. In the absence of effective local and national political organizations to draw these people into the political life of their nation and their localities, the time, resources, hope, and energies of millions of people can be organized by politically subversive groups for their own purposes. It is this political vacuum, especially at the village and local level, which has enabled the Communists in many areas to mobilize support by exploiting popular distress and uncertainty. Time, education, political experience, the extension of democratically organized activities and groups, economic progress, and the growth of community services are some of the developments which are needed to bring political stability and constrict the field of activity open to subversive groups. Given time and security from Communist aggression, these problems can be solved.

Meanwhile, the United States has embarked on extensive programs to encourage the development of conditions which will produce political and economic strength. Aside from providing weapons and essential military components and support to our Asian allies under the military assistance program, the United States proposes to use this

year \$825 million for defense support in Asian countries to enable them to build a strong economic base for mutual defense efforts. Beginning with the Act for International Development of 1950, the United States has sought to help the less developed areas of the Far East to raise their standard of living through the exchange of technical knowledge and skills. To continue this program in 1956, \$39.5 million was requested from Congress. Under this program—point 4, as it was originally called—the United States has sent hundreds of American technical specialists to Far Eastern countries and brought Asian technicians to the United States for training in private organizations, industry, educational institutions, and government agencies.

One of the most promising features of technical cooperation has been the program for arranging contracts between American and Far Eastern universities. These programs now cover problems of food, health, education, transportation, industry, conditions of labor, and public administration.

A further major effort will be undertaken with the President's Fund for Asian Economic Development, for which \$100 million has been appropriated by Congress. This fund will support a long-range program designed to serve as a catalyst for economic progress in a region which is the main focus of Communist pressures.

Through our information programs we have sought to strengthen the forces of progress and freedom in the Far East. In these programs we share with Asians our assessment of the Communist menace, and, despite Communist-inspired distortions, we help them acquire an understanding of the policies of the United States with respect to this danger. In the Pacific Charter and by our actions we have expressed our determination to forward their national hopes and aspirations. Since confidence in each other and confidence in us is of major importance in frustrating the divisive efforts of Communist propaganda and agita-

tion, we have worked to extend understanding and mutual respect among the peoples of the Far East.

The United States, in brief, has responded to the needs of these Far Eastern countries which are imperiled by the threats of a headstrong Chinese Communist imperialism firmly bound to the Soviet orbit. The United States has developed policies and programs to help these countries meet the threat of Chinese Communist military power by acting to repel direct Communist aggression, by helping them develop their own military forces, and by joining them in mutual and collective military security arrangements. To enable the countries of the Far East speedily to develop the necessary economic and political strength to overcome the efforts of Communist China to subvert them, we have embarked on a variety of technical aid programs and substantial programs of reconstruction and development. Meantime, through economic control measures and political actions, we have sought to restrict the growth of Chinese Communist strength and to limit its political influence and activities.

The final objective of all our policies is peace. In as many ways as seemed open to us, we have attempted to make the Chinese Communists respect the interests, rights, and legitimate aspirations of their neighbors and the other peoples of the free world. In this effort we have sought to develop close and enduring relations with the free countries and peoples of the Far East. We shall continue to promote, in association with them, the cause of independence, security, and progress. Our hope is that the Chinese Communist regime will recognize the strength of the countries of the non-Communist Far East and will be convinced of their own need to live in peace and security. Peace can come, however, only as the Chinese Communists are willing to accept or accommodate themselves to the existence of free countries and the rights and legitimate aspirations of free peoples. We stand in firm support of these rights and aspirations of our friends in the Far East.

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